[NukeNet] G8, GNEP and Japan's Fuel Cycle Failure
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
cnic at nifty.com
Thu Jul 13 23:51:48 CDT 2006
Press Release by Green Action and CNIC
Japan Should Withdraw its Opportunistic, Cynical and Impractical Offer
to Cooperate with the US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
Lessons the G8 Can Learn from Japan: the Nuclear Fuel Cycle is
an Economic Failure Providing No Energy
For Immediate Release: 14 July 2006
Contact: Philip White (CNIC) 03-5330-952
Tokyo and Kyoto, Japan----Japan has opportunistically jumped on
President George Bush's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)
bandwagon in the hope of aiding its troubled nuclear fuel cycle program
and gaining recognition for Japan's unique position as the only Non
Nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) member of the Non Proliferation Treaty
with access to the full nuclear fuel cycle.
It is difficult to imagine, however, that Japan could play a
significant role in GNEP seeing that its own nuclear waste problems at
home are in a prolonged state of crisis, and its fast breeder reactor
and MOX (mixed plutonium uranium oxide) fuel use programs are plagued
with delays.
Nevertheless, Kenji Kosaka, Japan's Minister of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), presented presented a document
to US Department of Energy Secretary Bodmon on May 5th outlining five
areas of research and development cooperation including collaboration
on the design of a US nuclear recycling facility and joint development
utilizing Joyo and Monju reactors.
However, on July 6th, when CNIC asked MEXT representatives about the
May 5th statement it was told, "nothing concrete has been decided". It
was also told that there is no budget set aside for this proposal.
"When the G8 discusses the nuclear fuel cycle, it should bear in mind
the lessons from Japan's experience. Japan's nuclear fuel cycle program
has been under development in the name of 'energy independence' for
half a century. However, not a single watt of electricity is being
generated by it today. Despite spending several trillion yen (tens of
billions of U.S. dollars) of ratepayer and taxpayer money, closing the
Japanese fuel cycle has been an economic failure and a detriment to
public safety," stated Aileen Mioko Smith, director of Green Action.
Japan's Rokkasho reprocessing plant, located in Aomori Prefecture in
the north of Japan, is now undergoing "active testing" leading up to
commercial operation scheduled for August 2007. The plant is slated to
separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for use in Japan's nuclear
reactors. At a cost of 2.3 trillion yen (about 20 billion U.S.) to
ratepayers, it is said to be the most expensive plant ever built in the
history of the world.
The Japanese government and utilities estimate that the total bill for
choosing the reprocessing option and operating the Rokkasho
reprocessing plant will be 19 trillion yen (about $160 billion U.S.),
far more than disposing without reprocessing. The calculations are
highly optimistic since it assumes the reprocessing plant will operate
at full capacity. A second reprocessing plant will be needed for the
spent fuel that Rokkasho cannot handle.
Other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle program fare no better. Scheduled
to have started in 1999, the use of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX)
fuel in commercial nuclear reactors is yet to begin.
The third pillar of Japan's nuclear fuel cycle program is its fast
breeder reactor program, which after 50 years of development has
produced a grand total of 1 hour of electricity. Future prospects
appear no brighter. The government's current nuclear energy policy has
the fast breeder commercialized by 2050, an astonishing 70 years behind
the original schedule set in 1961.
Since Japan does not now have the capacity to reprocess all the spent
fuel from its own nuclear reactors, it is stretching the imagination to
think that it will ever have the capacity, under the GNEP plan, to
reprocess spent fuel from overseas. And given the difficulty of finding
a repository for Japan's own high-level waste, it is inconceivable that
there will be any volunteers to accept foreign waste.
Anticipating this problem, the Japanese government has already
indicated that it will not take back spent fuel from overseas. This
undermines Japan's aspirations to the status of "fuel supplier nation".
We believe GNEP's chances of success are zero in any case, but when
aspiring fuel supplier nations pick and choose in this way, GNEP is
exposed for the fraud that it is.
With a record like this, one would have thought that, rather than
jumping on the GNEP bandwagon, the Japanese government would be looking
for a way out of its nuclear fuel cycle program. Pursuing the elusive
dream of "closed" nuclear fuel cycles, such as those promised by GNEP,
will mire Japan and the US in a quagmire of higher nuclear power costs,
increased plutonium surplus, and snowballing nuclear waste headaches.
The government hopes that GNEP will provide a lifeline for Japan's
ailing nuclear industry. However, it is far less clear that electric
power companies share this enthusiasm. They are the ones who will have
to sell any electricity produced by the reactors envisaged under GNEP
and they are under no illusions about the likely price.
It is important to note that somewhere in all of this, the Japanese
government has lost site of the fact that it is highly unlikely that
GNEP could help provide the Japanese public with any substantive source
of energy in any reasonable length of time.
Not only will GNEP not contribute to meeting the world's energy demand,
GNEP will not reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. It will not
reduce the burden of radioactive waste produced by nuclear power
plants. The money wasted on GNEP would be far better spent on
sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels and nuclear power.
The Japanese government is not in a position to make a substantial
contribution to GNEP's purported aims. Rather, the government's offer
to cooperate with GNEP is opportunistic, cynical, and impractical. Like
its contribution to the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq, its
contribution to GNEP will be purely symbolic.
Japan should not participate in GNEP. Rather, it should address the
problems nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle have created at home,
and invest in non-nuclear alternatives---energy conservation,
efficiency, and sustainable, renewable energy.
------------
For a more detailed commentary
see: http://cnic.jp/english/news/newsflash/2006/gnep11Jul06.html
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center
3F Kotobuki Bdg, 1-58-15, Higashi-Nakano, Nakano-ku, Tokyo 164-0003
Phone: 81-3-5330-9520
Fax: 81-3-5330-9530
http://cnic.jp/english/
cnic at nifty.com
More information about the Nukenet
mailing list