[NukeNet] Call for sign-ons: NGO letter re US India Nuclear Deal

Thu Dec 6 04:53:16 EST 2007

US-India nuclear deal

Call for organizational sign-ons to letter to NSG governments and 
governments represented on the IAEA Board of Directors

Crunch time is approaching for the US-India nuclear deal. Recognizing 
that they only have a small window of opportunity to finalize the deal 
before the US Presidential election gets in the way, the governments of 
both countries are mounting a last ditch effort to clinch a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA and gain a special India-specific exemption 
from the guidelines of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The 
IAEA safeguards agreement and the NSG exemption are required before the 
US Congress can approve the bi-lateral agreement.

We have launched this international sign-on letter, because we are 
gravely concerned about the implications of the US-India nuclear deal 
for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Reports suggest that the 
deal could be pushed through the IAEA and NSG as early as January 2008, 
so we are aiming to collect as many organizational sign-ons as possible 
by 20 December and to send the letter to governments at the beginning 
of January 2008.

The letter is written in a way that presents some basic facts about why 
the deal is problematic, raises key issues for the recipient 
governments to consider, and makes a number of recommendations about 
what should/should not be done. It attempts to stake out the 
"maximalist" position while also trying to address the specific legal 
and policy questions that might resonate with the broadest range of NSG 
governments.

We urge you to endorse the letter below and to encourage other NGOs to 
do likewise. Please send your endorsement to the following email 
address by Tuesday 20 December 2007:

whitecynic at yahoo.com

For more information about the US-India deal, please refer to the 
following web sites:

http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/india/

http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindia.html

Signed:

Daryl Kimball,
Executive Director, Arms Control Association, USA

Stephen Staples,
Global Secretariat, Abolition 2000
(Director, Rideau Institute on International Affairs, Canada)

Philip White,
Coordinator, Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group
(International Liaison Officer, Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, 
Japan)

-------------
Fix the Proposal for Renewed Cooperation with India

December 31, 2007

Dear Foreign Minister

In the coming weeks the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board 
of Governors will likely be asked to consider a new "India-specific" 
safeguards agreement that would cover a limited number of additional 
"civilian" reactors. Shortly thereafter, the members of the 45-nation 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will be asked to take a position on the 
Bush administration's proposal to exempt India from longstanding NSG 
guidelines that require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of 
supply.

Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the proposed arrangement fails 
to bring India further into conformity with the nonproliferation 
behavior expected of other states. India's commitments under the 
current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making 
far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and 
norms. Consequently, the proposed arrangement would damage the already 
fragile nuclear nonproliferation system and set back efforts to achieve 
universal nuclear disarmament.

We are writing to urge your government to consider the full 
implications of the proposed agreement and to play an active role in 
proposing and supporting measures that would help ensure that this 
controversial proposal does not:

* further undermine the nuclear safeguards system and efforts to 
prevent the proliferation of technologies that may be used to produce 
nuclear bomb material;
* in any way contribute to nuclear proliferation and/or the expansion 
of India's nuclear arsenal; or
* otherwise grant India the benefits of civil nuclear trade without 
holding it to the same standards expected of other states parties of 
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Because the NSG and IAEA traditionally operate by consensus, your 
government has a pivotal role to play. Please consider the following:

1) India is seeking unprecedented "India-specific" safeguards over the 
additional facilities it has declared "civilian". Such safeguards could 
allow India to cease IAEA scrutiny if fuel supplies are cut off because 
it renews nuclear testing. Indian officials suggest that they will seek 
safeguards that are contingent upon the continued supply of nuclear 
fuel from foreign suppliers. India may also assert that it has the 
option to remove certain "indigenous" reactors from safeguards if 
foreign fuel supplies are interrupted, even if that is because it has 
resumed nuclear testing. Such proposals should be rejected whether they 
might be included in the actual safeguards agreement or accompanying 
statements.
As part of the final document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension 
Conference, all NPT states parties endorsed the principle of full-scope 
safeguards as a condition of supply. A decision by the 45-nation NSG to 
exempt India from this requirement for India would contradict this 
important element of the NPT bargain.
We urge your government to actively oppose any arrangement that would 
give India any special safeguards exemptions or which would in any way 
be inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards over all 
nuclear materials and facilities.

2) India pledged in July 2005 to conclude an Additional Protocol to its 
safeguards agreement. Given that India maintains a nuclear weapons 
program outside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a few 
additional "civilian" reactors provide no serious nonproliferation 
benefits. States should insist that India conclude a meaningful 
Additional Protocol safeguards regime before the IAEA Board of 
Governors considers a new draft safeguards agreement and certainly 
before the NSG takes a decision on exempting India from its rules.

3) The United States has put forward a draft NSG guideline that would 
allow NSG states to continue providing India with nuclear supplies even 
if New Delhi breaks its nuclear test moratorium pledge. Indian 
officials say they want changes to NSG guidelines that do not impinge 
upon their ability to resume nuclear testing. The U.S. proposal on 
India at the NSG would, in the case of a resumption of nuclear testing 
by India, make the suspension of nuclear trade optional for NSG 
members. Such an approach would undercut the international norm against 
nuclear testing and make a mockery of NSG guidelines. If the NSG 
members agree by consensus to exempt India from the full-scope 
safeguards standard, they should in the very least clarify that all 
nuclear trade by NSG member states shall immediately cease if India 
resumes nuclear testing for any reason.

4) India seeking exemptions from NSG guidelines and IAEA supply 
guarantees that would allow supplier states to provide India with a 
strategic fuel reserve that could be used to outlast any fuel supply 
cut off or sanctions that may be imposed if it resumes nuclear testing. 
The U.S.-India bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement includes 
political commitments to support an Indian strategic fuel reserve and 
an "India-specific" fuel supply arrangement. If NSG supplier states 
should agree to supply fuel to India, they should do so in a manner 
that is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements.

5) India is seeking and the United States has proposed an NSG guideline 
that would open the way for other nuclear suppliers to transfer 
sensitive plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy water 
production technology to India even though IAEA safeguards cannot 
prevent such technology from being replicated and used in its weapons 
program. India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 that used plutonium 
harvested from a heavy water reactor supplied by Canada and the United 
States in violation of bilateral peaceful nuclear use agreements. U.S. 
officials have stated that they do not intend to sell such technology. 
But other states, including France, may. Virtually all NSG states 
support proposals that would bar transfers of these sensitive nuclear 
technologies to non-NPT members and should under no circumstances 
endorse an NSG rule that would allow the transfer of such technology to 
India.

6) Absent a decision by New Delhi to halt the production of fissile 
material for weapons purposes, foreign fuel supplies would allow India 
not only to continue but also to potentially accelerate the buildup of 
its stockpile of nuclear weapons materials. This would not only 
contradict the goal of Article I of the NPT but also violate that 
article and it would foster further nuclear competition between India 
and Pakistan. Has your government conducted an independent assessment 
of the impact of foreign fuel supplies on India's weapons production 
capacity and the security balance in South Asia?

7) UN Security Council Resolution 1172 calls on India and Pakistan to 
sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and stop producing 
fissile material for weapons. Your government is bound by the UN 
Charter to support the implementation of this resolution. Before India 
is granted a waiver from the NSG's full-scope safeguards standard, it 
should join the other original nuclear weapon states by declaring it 
has stopped fissile material production for weapons purposes and, like 
the 177 other states that have signed the CTBT, make a legally-binding 
commitment to permanently end nuclear testing. India's verbal 
commitment to support negotiations of a global verifiable fissile 
material cut off treaty is a hollow gesture given the fact that states 
have failed to initiate negotiations on such a treaty for over a 
decade.

Conclusion
If your government is truly dedicated to the goal of stopping the 
spread of nuclear weapons, ending nuclear arms races, and strengthening 
rules governing the transfer of nuclear material and technology, it 
will insist upon these and other vital nonproliferation measures. We 
look forward to your responses to our questions and recommendations.

Sincerely,

Daryl G. Kimball,
Executive Director,
Arms Control Association (Washington, DC, USA)

Steven Staples
Director
Rideau Institute on International Affairs (Canada)

Hideyuki Ban
Co-Director
Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo, Japan)

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Kate Hudson
Chairperson
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament UK

Shingo Fukuyama,
Secretary General,
Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (GENSUIKIN) (Japan)

Akira Kawasaki
Executive Committee
Peace Boat Japan

Park Jung-eun
Chief Coordinator
Center for Peace and Disarmament
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (South Korea) 

David Heller
Coordinator
Friends of the Earth, Flanders & Brussels (Belgium)

Cam Walker
National Liaison Officer
Friends of the Earth, Australia

Terri Lodge
Coordinator
Arms Control Advocacy Collaborative (USA)

Jon Rainwater
Executive Director
Peace Action West
Berkeley, California, USA

Contact Addresses:
1. Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group
c/o Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, Akebonobashi Co-op 2F-B, 8-5 
Sumiyoshi-cho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-0065, Japan
Tel: 03-3357-3800 Fax: 03-3357-3801
http://cnic.jp/english/topics/plutonium/proliferation/usindia.html

2. Arms Control Association
1313 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20005
http://www.armscontrol.org
aca at armscontrol.org 
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