[NukeNet] Israeli, Middle East, N African Nuclear Vulnerability To Military Attack

[Bill Smirnow]

----- Original Message ----- 
From: <Bennettramberg at aol.com>
To: <smirnowb at ix.netcom.com>
Sent: Monday, December 31, 2007 2:28 PM
Subject: BenRamberg OpEd: "Close Israel's Dimona Reactor Now"

   Project Syndicate distributed the following OpEd globally.  Lebanon's
"The
Daily Star" is among a number of newspapers that picked up the commentary.
-----------
THE DAILY STAR

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?article_ID=87599&categ_ID=5&edition_id
=10

Close down Dimona - the risks are just not worth it

By Bennett Ramberg

Saturday, December 22, 2007

Nuclear facilities as military targets? The drumbeat appears to be growing
louder. Western leaders repeatedly declare that no option is off the table
to
stem Iran's nuclear ambitions. And, in mid-November, London's Sunday Times
reported that Israel put defenses around its Dimona nuclear reactor on "red
alert"
30 times, as worries grew that Syria would avenge Israel's September attack
on
a suspected nuclear site in Syria.

Israel's fear reflects the Middle East's unique history. Since World War II,
strikes to halt nuclear activities have taken place exclusively in the
region:
Iraq was struck by Iran in 1980, by Israel in 1981, and by the United States
in 1991 and in 2003, while Iraq bombed Iran in 1984-87 and Israel in 1991.
But
raids never generated significant radiological consequences, because plants
were under construction, contained inconsequential amounts of nuclear
material,
had radioactive elements removed prior to the attack, or because the
attacker
missed the mark.

A successful strike on Dimona, however, would be another matter. So,
given the threat of radioactive releases, does the plant's continued
operation outweigh the risks?

Dimona is unique. It is the region's largest nuclear plant and sole producer
of atomic weapons materials. Since it went into operation in the mid-1960s,
it
has generated elements for an estimated 200 nuclear weapons. Israel's first
prime minister, David Ben Gurion, inaugurated the enterprise to compensate
for
Israel's strategic vulnerability, a fledgling army, and the West's
unwillingness to enter into a formal alliance to defend the Jewish state.

Dimona is no Chernobyl. It generates only about 5 percent of that failed
Soviet reactor's power. Still, the plant - along with its spent nuclear
fuel,
extracted plutonium, and nuclear reprocessing waste - poses significant
radiological hazards that a military strike could disperse into the
environment.

Israeli officials tacitly acknowledge the risk. Authorities have distributed
potassium iodide tablets to the nearby towns of Yerham, Dimona, and Aruar.
Potassium iodide blocks thyroid absorption of radioactive iodine, an early
risk
in a nuclear release. But it would not obstruct serious health consequences
from other radioactive elements. And, depending on weather and the nuclear
discharge, the radioactive consequences may not remain localized.

Light contamination and hot spots could impact Israeli, Palestinian, and
Jordanian urban centers some distance away. Beyond health effects,
contamination
could terrorize affected populations, prompting temporary flight and
permanent
relocation. Serious, long-term economic consequences would follow.

For decades, Israel dealt with this risk through effective air defenses and
disdain for its adversaries' ability to strike Dimona. In May 1984, after I
authored a book about the consequences of military attacks on nuclear
facilities,
an Israeli intelligence officer came to California to question me about the
vulnerability of the reactor and a proposed nuclear power plant. The officer
belittled the risk, arguing that no Arab air force had ever overcome Israeli
air
defenses, and none ever would.

At that time, history provided odd support. Although Egyptian
reconnaissance aircraft had flown near Dimona in 1965 and 1967 without
incident, during the June 1967 war Israel shot down one of its own Mirage
jet
fighters when it strayed over the facility. In 1973, Dimona's defenders
downed a
wayward Libyan civilian airliner heading for the reactor, killing 108
people.

But the 1991 Gulf War upset whatever solace Israel could take from the past.
Iraqi Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv, and one came close to hitting Dimona.
Hizbullah's bombardment of northern Israel in 2006 further demonstrated the
country's vulnerability to missile attack. And, while Israel's Arrow
ballistic missile
defenses, which now surround Dimona, may be superior to the Patriot system
that failed in 1991, Syria's more advanced Scuds and Iran's Shahab-3 rocket
present a more capable challenge than Saddam's projectiles.

Dimona has produced all the plutonium that Israel reasonably needs, and the
reactor - one of the world's oldest - has suffered minor mishaps and evident
deterioration, raising the specter of more serious accidents. So, if Israel
cannot guarantee the plant's defense against attack, it should close it.

By doing so, Israel could also derive political benefits. It could claim
that
closure demonstrates its commitment to reducing regional nuclear tensions,
while sending a message about the wisdom of building reactors in the world's
most volatile region.

Indeed, about a dozen Middle East and North African countries intend to
build
nuclear power plants. Given the historic targeting of atomic  installations,
planners should consider whether providing adversaries with radiological
targets far larger than Dimona makes sense. Until the Middle East resolves
its
political differences, it may not.
_____________________

Bennett Ramberg served in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the
administration of President George H.W. Bush. He is the author of several
books on
international security. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in
collaboration with Project Syndicate (c) (www.project-syndicate.org)


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