[NukeNet] Nuke Power Defense Impractical Government Admits, "Irresponsible To The Extreme" Says Watchdog

[Bill Smirnow]

  Dear All,
                  In light of Senator Boxer's
statement below and that of the highly respected
Daniel Hirsch & "The Committee To Bridge The Gap"
[NOT "The Community To Bridge The Gap" as the
story misstates the name]
  please immediately call your Rep & Senators, all
available via phone at: 202-224-3121 and
1-877-762-8762 and tell them the NRC and the
industry they are tasked with overseeing are
grossly endangering every single US citizen and
act as lapdogs, lying to all of us and that
nuclear power plants have to be securized in a
realistic manner before being replaced with
renewable energy. Ask them to call "The Committee
To Bridge The Gap" [
http://www.envirolink.org/resource.html?itemid=962&catid=5 ]
Committee to Bridge the Gap
Nuclear Information and Resource Service [
http://www.nirs.org ]



for contact:  Daniel Hirsch (831) 336-8003
31 January 2006

] and have Hirsch testify before congress with
other experts like Paul Gunther of NIRS [
http://www.nirs.org ] . The Canadian and Mexican
governments as well as most of those throughout
the northern hemisphere should also be extremely
interested in this material and the lies of NRC
and industry. Please forward this to other lists
and interested parties as well as media outlets
after you make a couple of brief calls.

 >Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., said that NRC
appears not to have followed the direction of
Congress ''to >ensure that our nuclear power
plants are protected from air- or land-based
terrorist threats'' of the >magnitude demonstrated
on Sept. 11.

  >Daniel Hirsch, president of the Community to
Bridge the Gap, a California-based nuclear
watchdog >group that had urged the NRC to require
physical barriers to keep planes from hitting
reactors, called the >security measures
''irresponsible to the extreme.''
>''Rather than upgrading protections, (the NRC
plan) merely codifies the status quo, reaffirming
the >existing, woefully inadequate security
measures already in place at the nation's
reactors,'' said Hirsch.



  >NRC Chairman Dale Klein said in a statement,
adding that plant operators already must be able
to >manage large fires or explosions, no matter
the cause.

   Does Klein mean like they did at Chernobyl?
How the ___ do you manage Chernobyl? Letting
thousands or tens of thousands of people die and
polluting the genetic pool and environment as well
as extraordinary economic damage is  the NRC's
idea of management. We must stop these criminal
fools before there's another catastrophe [ or more
than one].

    How these people sleep at night is beyond me.

      -Bill Smirnow




http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/us/AP-Reactor-Security.html
    Nuclear Agency: Air Defenses Impractical
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By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: January 29, 2007
Filed at 11:20 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON (AP) -- Making nuclear power plants
crash-proof to an airliner attack by terrorists is
impracticable and it's up to the military to avert
such an assault, the government said Monday.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a revised
security policy, directed nuclear plant operators
to focus on preventing radiation from escaping in
case of such an attack and to improve evacuation
plans to protect public health and safety.

''The active protection against airborne threats
is addressed by other federal organizations,
including the military,'' the NRC said in a
statement.

The agency rejected calls by some nuclear watchdog
groups that the government establish firm no-fly
zones near reactors or that plant operators build
''lattice-like'' barriers to protect reactors, or
be required to have anti-aircraft weapons on site
to shoot down an incoming plane.

The NRC, in a summary of the mostly secret
security plan, said such proposals were examined,
but that it was concluded the ''active
protection'' against an airborne threat rests with
organizations such as the military or the Federal
Aviation Administration.

It said that various mitigation strategies
required of plant operators -- such as radiation
protection measures and evacuation plans -- ''are
sufficient to ensure adequate protection of the
public health and safety'' in case of an airborne
attack.

The commission unanimously approved the plan,
which has been the subject of internal discussions
for 15 months, in a 5-0 vote at a brief meeting
without discussion.

''Nuclear power plants are inherently robust
structures that our studies show provide adequate
protection in a hypothetical attack by an
airplane,'' NRC Chairman Dale Klein said in a
statement, adding that plant operators already
must be able to manage large fires or explosions,
no matter the cause.

Klein called the new rule ''only one piece'' of an
effort to enhance reactor security and said the
NRC will continue to examine and discuss the issue
of airborne threats and take additional actions if
found to be necessary.

The defense plan, formally known as the Design
Basis Threat, spells out what type of attack force
the government believes might target a commercial
power reactor and what its operator must be
capable of defending against.

While details are sketchy because of security
concerns, the plan requires defense against a
relatively small force, perhaps no more than a
half-dozen attackers, but that they could come
from multiple directions including by water and
could include suicide teams.

The plan, which formally approves many of the
procedures that have long been in place, reflects
the increased concerns raised by the Sept. 11,
2001, terrorist attacks. It also includes measures
to address cyber attacks, according to the NRC.

Some members of Congress and nuclear watchdog
groups have argued that the requirements fall
short of what is needed, given what was learned by
the Sept. 11 attacks on the twin towers in New
York and at the Pentagon.

These critics have argued that defenders of a
reactor should be ready to face up to 19
attackers -- as was the case on Sept. 11 -- and
expect them to have rocket-propelled grenades,
so-called ''platter'' explosive charges and
.50-caliber armor-piercing ammunition.

The NRC does not assume such weapons being used
and rejected the idea of a 19-member attack force,
maintaining that the Sept. 11 attacks actually
were four separate attacks, each by four or five
terrorists.

Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., said that NRC
appears not to have followed the direction of
Congress ''to ensure that our nuclear power plants
are protected from air- or land-based terrorist
threats'' of the magnitude demonstrated on Sept.
11.

The NRC ''has missed an opportunity to provide the
public with a real solution to the nuclear reactor
security problem,'' said Rep. Edward Markey,
D-Mass., a frequent critic of the nuclear industry
and the NRC.

Daniel Hirsch, president of the Community to
Bridge the Gap, a California-based nuclear
watchdog group that had urged the NRC to require
physical barriers to keep planes from hitting
reactors, called the security measures
''irresponsible to the extreme.''

''Rather than upgrading protections, (the NRC
plan) merely codifies the status quo, reaffirming
the existing, woefully inadequate security
measures already in place at the nation's
reactors,'' said Hirsch.

NRC officials have emphasized that the defense
plan should require what is ''reasonable'' to be
expected of a civilian security force at the 103
commercial nuclear power reactors.

In an unclassified summary of the DBT, the NRC
maintains that studies ''confirm the low
likelihood'' that an aircraft crashing into a
reactor will damage the reactor core and release
radioactivity, affecting public health and safety.

''Even in the unlikely event of a radiological
release due to a terrorist use of a large aircraft
against a nuclear power plant, the studies
indicate that there would be time to implement the
required onsite mitigating actions,'' says the
summary.

------

On the Net:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: www.nrc.gov

Nuclear Energy Institute: www.nei.org    The Times
only gives these two, both pro-nuclear URLs. See:
http://www.nirs.org
http://www.tmia.com/sabter.html  for realistic
assessments of the facts.