[NukeNet] US-India Deal: aiding proliferation and nuclear renaissance

[Citizens' Nuclear Information Center]

Most people probably noticed that yesterday the Indian government 
survived a vote of no-confidence over the US-india deal.

Besides being a disaster for non-proliferation, the US-India is also a 
potential bonanza for the nuclear industry. Stopping the deal will be a 
plus for disarmament and a spanner in the works for the nuclear 
renaissance.

The nonproliferation problems with the deal are well articulated in the 
article below.

Philip

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20292

4. A Nonproliferation Disaster
By Jayantha Dhanapala and Daryl Kimball

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Proliferation Analysis, July 10, 2008

Decision time has arrived on the controversial nuclear cooperation 
proposal that was first proposed by President George W. Bush and Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005.

After a long delay, the Indian government has sidestepped domestic 
critics of the deal and is asking the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors to consider a new “India-specific” 
safeguards agreement that would cover a limited number of additional 
“civilian” reactors. The IAEA Board could meet on the matter by the end 
of July.

Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration will ask the other 44 
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to exempt India from 
longstanding NSG guidelines that require full-scope IAEA safeguards as 
a condition of supply. Comprehensive safeguards are intended to prevent 
the use of civilian nuclear technology and material for weapons 
purposes.

Because the NSG and IAEA traditionally operate by consensus, any one of 
a number of states can act to block or modify the ill-conceived 
arrangement. They have good reason and a responsibility to do so.

Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the deal fails to bring India 
further into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of 
the member states of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unlike 
178 other countries, India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT). It continues to produce fissile material and expand its 
arsenal.

Yet, the arrangement would give India the rights and privileges of 
civil nuclear trade that have been reserved only for members of the 
NPT. It creates a dangerous distinction between "good" proliferators 
and "bad" proliferators sending out misleading signals to the 
international community with regard to NPT norms.

In fact, the current proposal threatens to further undermine the 
nuclear safeguards system and efforts to prevent the proliferation of 
technologies that may be used to produce nuclear bomb material. It 
would also indirectly contribute to the expansion of India’s nuclear 
arsenal with possible consequences for a nuclear arms race in Asia.

In particular, India is seeking an "India-specific" safeguards 
agreement that could – depending on how it is interpreted -- allow 
India to cease IAEA scrutiny if fuel supplies are cut off even it that 
is because it renews nuclear testing. In the preamble of the proposed 
safeguards agreement, which was distributed yesterday, India states 
that it may take unspecified "corrective actions" to ensure fuel 
supplies in the event that they are interrupted. IAEA Board members 
should get clarification before taking a decision and reject any 
interpretation that is inconsistent with the principle of permanent 
safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities.

As part of the carefully crafted final document of the 1995 NPT Review 
and Extension Conference, all NPT states-parties endorsed the principle 
of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. A decision by the 
NSG to exempt India from this requirement for India would contradict 
this important element of the NPT bargain.

India also pledged in July 2005 to conclude an additional protocol to 
its safeguards agreement. Given that India maintains a nuclear weapons 
program outside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a few 
additional “civilian” reactors provide no serious nonproliferation 
benefits. States should insist that India conclude a meaningful 
Additional Protocol safeguards regime before the NSG takes a decision 
on exempting India from its rules.

Incredibly, Indian officials also want exemptions from NSG guidelines 
that would allow supplier states to provide India with a strategic fuel 
reserve that could be used to outlast any fuel supply cut off or 
sanctions that may be imposed if it resumes nuclear testing.

This flatly contradicts provisions in the 2006 U.S. implementing 
legislation that were authored by Sen. Barack Obama. If NSG supplier 
states should agree to supply fuel to India, they should clarify that 
if India resumes nuclear testing, all nuclear cooperation with India 
shall be terminated and unused fuel supplies from NSG states shall be 
returned.

India is also demanding “full” nuclear cooperation, including access to 
advanced plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, and heavy water 
production technology. This is extremely unwise given that IAEA 
safeguards cannot prevent such sensitive technology from being 
replicated and used in India’s weapons program.

Recall that India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 that used 
plutonium harvested from a heavy water reactor supplied by Canada and 
the United States in violation of earlier peaceful nuclear use 
agreements. U.S. officials have stated that they do not intend to sell 
such technology, but other states may. Virtually all NSG states support 
proposals that would bar transfers of these sensitive nuclear 
technologies to non-NPT members and should under no circumstances 
endorse an NSG rule that would allow the transfer of such technology to 
India.

Unfortunately, India has refused to join the five original 
nuclear-weapon states in suspending the production of fissile material 
for weapons and signing the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Not 
only would these measures curb nuclear competition in Asia, but it 
would avoid the possibility that foreign fuel supplies will free-up 
India’s limited uranium supplies for weapons use and help India to 
accelerate the buildup of its arsenal. This would contradict the goal 
of Article I of the NPT, which prohibits direct or indirect assistance 
to another state’s nuclear weapons program.

All UN members states are also obligated to support UN Security Council 
Resolution 1172, which calls on India and Pakistan to sign the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) stop producing fissile material 
for weapons, and undertake other nuclear risk reduction measures.

The Indian nuclear deal would be a nonproliferation disaster, 
especially now.  The NPT is in jeopardy and diplomatic efforts to 
address the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran are at a delicate 
stage. For those world leaders who are serious about ending the arms 
race, holding all states to their international commitments, and 
strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it is time to stand 
up and be counted.

Jayantha Dhanapala is a former UN Under-Secretary-General for 
Disarmament Affairs (1998-2003) and a former Ambassador of Sri Lanka 
who was President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. 
Daryl G. Kimball is the executive director of the Washington, 
D.C.-based Arms Control Association.